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I.

THE RIGHT OF REVIEW

A right of appeal involves the existence of a hierarchy of
courts, and a hierarchy of courts presupposes a somewhat highly
developed political system. Hence in early times the court of
first instance, as the immediate delegate ofothe judicial power of
the government, heard and disposed of cases with absolute finality. Such was the situation in Rome in the simple days of the
Republic, and it was only with the more elaborate organization
of the Empire that a system of judicial appeals came into existence (Hunter on Roman Law (4th Ed.) 1044). The same situation was repeated in England. In the twelfth century there
was no appeal from inferior courts to the king's court, but there
were methods of removing cases before judgment. The ecclesiastical courts, however, deriving their organization from Roman
sources, became a model which finally brought into existence a
civil system of judicial reviewr (2 Pollock and Maitland, Hist.
of English Law (2nd Ed.) 664-66).
Once the principle of judicial appeal is established, a conflict
arises as to how far it should be carried. The pressure for extension comes from defeated litigants because of their hope of
faring better on a further hearing, and from the legal profession
because it enlarges the sc6pe of their business. Resistance comes
from the public, who see no virtue in protracted litigation and
no reason for maintaining courts at public expense for the benefit
of stubborn and contentious parties who have already had as
much consideration as they are entitled to.
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There are really two questions involved. In what cases
should appeals be permitted, and at what stages should those appeals take place? Assuming that a case falls within the class
'where appeals are advisable, should the review be postponed
until final judgment and a single appeal be taken therefrom, or
should appeals be allowed from interlocutory orders as they are
made? On neither question is there any unanimity of views.
In general it is better to restrict appeals to matters of sufficient
importance to justify the expense to the public and to the parties,
but there is absolutely no test for measuring the importance of
cases which has ever met with general approval. A case involving $100 is considered important enough to go to the Supreme Court of Kansas (Gen. St. 1901, No. 5019), but nothing
less than $4,500 will suffice for review by the Supreme Court of
Missouri (Laws 1901, p. 107). In Michigan every case which
can be tried in the circuit court can be reviewed in the Supreme
Court (Pub. Acts 1919, No. 14), while in Texas the disagreement
of the judges of the Court of Civil Appeals makes the case worthy
of review by the Supreme Court (Comp. St. 1920, Art. 1521). It
is very common to allow appeals in all cases involving taxation,
or title to land, or franchises, or the validity of legislation.
There is one thing to be said in favor of no restrictions at
all-it will save an immense amount of useless litigation over
the question whether parties may or may not appeal particular
cases. Every restriction to ward off appeals creates litigation
over the force and effect of the restriction itself. Machinery to
save labor may become so complex as to waste more labor than
it saves.
On the other question, whether the appeal should wait for
the final judgment, there is a better chance for intelligent expermentation. The problem here is primarily one of conservation of effort. If the interlocutory order is reviewed at once it
may render subsequent proceedings unnecessary, as in the case
of an order granting a new trial, or an order bringing in a new
party or a new cause of action, or an order which in effect determines or involves the merits; in all of which cases there will
be a definite advantage of convenience in proceeding immediately
with the appeal. Such an appeal may sometimes prevent ir-
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reparable injury, as in cases of granting, refusing or dissolving
injunctions, or ordering the sale of property. On the other
hand, courts would be utterly paralyzed if there were no restriction upon the right to take an appeal upon every order or
ruling which either party wished to challenge.- Where is the
line to be drawn? It is a question to be solved by experience
alone, and as experience furnishes very complex, incomplete, and
unintelligible data, there is no reasonable hope of ever settling
the problem finally. It will doubtless continue to be treated experimentally, with frequent alterations to meet the shifting opinions of those in a position to influence legislation.
One aspect of the problem has been too little considered in
the United States, and that is the economic as well as political
value of-better trial procedure and more capable trial judges.
If the efficiency of the trial court were improved, in both the inferior and superior grades, litigants might be more willing to
accept the decision and forego any appeal. It might be that the
immense volume of appeals which we suffer from is an indication
of a want of confidence in our courts of first instance. The direct
cost of appeals to the parties and to the state, and the indirect
cost to soiciety and industry of the delays resulting therefrom,
represent the saving ideally possible if trial courts could function
to. the entire satisfaction of litigants. Courts never do and"
never can satisfy all parties, but there is certainly a marked difference between the number of appeals from judges who are
felt to be unusually capable and from those whose ability is not
respected. In the absence of statistics one can only speculate
as to the extent of this difference. It is.worthy of note; however,
that England, whose judicial system works very much better
than ours, spares no pains to obtain the very highest grade of
judges in her trial courts. English county court judges have a
jurisdiction practically equivalent to our justices of the peace.
They must be barristers of at least seven years standing, are appointed for life by the Lord Chancellor, are paid a salary of
$7,500.00 a year, and are entitled to an annual disability pension
of $5,000.00 (County Courts Acts of 1888 and 1903, Secs. 8, 23,
24). The judges of the King's Bench and Chancery Divisions
have a jurisdiction equivalent to our circuit or district courts.
They must be barristers of at least ten years standing, are ap-
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pointed for life, are paid a salary of $25,000.00, and are entitled
to a pension after fifteen years service, or upon disability of
$17,000.00 a year. The Lord Chief Justice is not an appellate
judge, but a trial court judge; his salary is $40,000.00, and his
pension is $20,000.00. The judges of the Court of Appeal receive no higher salaries than the judges of the trial courts. The
English instinct for judicial administration has always recognized the trial, rather than the appeal, as the primary field of
court operation. Until 1907 no review for errors committed during the course of the trial was provided for in criminal cases (1
Holdsworth, Hist. of Eng. Law, 217). A high class trial bench
has been the very corner stone of English judicial policy. The
Judicature Act. of 1873 abolished the appellate jurisdiction of the
House of Lords, but before it became operative a conservative
reaction of feeling came to the rescue of that historic appellate
tribunal, largely on sentimental grounds. With trial judges
fully equal in ability and professional standing to the judges of
appeal, there is far less inclination to question their decisions.
Correcting errors on review is a clumsy and unsatisfactory substitute for trying the case properly in the first place. If Mr.
Henry Ford ran his factory on the theory which we adopt in our
courts, allowing his cars to be built under the direction of low
galaried shop superintendents and only using his high salaried
engineers to inspect for errors after the work was done, and to
send back all imperfected cars to be rebuilt, he would. have been
bankrupt long ago. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure. The real problem of appeals is to avoid appeals,-to make
our trial so efficient that appeals will seldom be asked for.
II. METHODS OF REVIEW
When we pass to the consideration of methods of review,
we enter a field where much more definite conclusions are possible. We are here concerned with mechanical problems which
are peculiarly within the knowledge of the legal profession.
Every appeal is conducted by lawyers, who are required to decide upon the method to be selected and to carry out every procedural step involved in that method, and the advantages and
disadvantages can be readily appraised.
It is a matter of familiar knowledge that one of the most
serious objections to the common law system of pleading was
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the variety of forms of action and the technical distinctions to
be obsetved in their use, and it is probable that this was the
primary cause for the ibJandoninent of common law pleading and
the adoption of the code* in* the majority of American States.
Forms of actions were a product of historical causes which had
long ceased to have any practical significance. Their use entailed both the risk of a wrong choice and familiarity with a
large body of technical rules which would otherwise have had
no reason for existence. The typical American Code begins with
the legislative announcement that forms of action are hereby
abolished and hereafter there shall be in this state but one form
of action to be known as a civil action.
Now the situation is practically identical in regard to forms
of appeal. The writ of error, the writ of certiorari, the writ of
prohibition, and the writ of nzand'amvs, were developed by the common law of England in exactly the same way as the forms of
action, and equity developed another form of review by appeal to
meet its own .peculiar requirements. Every form has its own
special use and its own special procedure. Each has its strong
points and its Weak points, but the. bad has to be taken with the
good, so that whatever form one uses it is necessary to sacrifice
something in order to gain something else.
If you choose the wrong form you will entirely fail in your
effort to review the case, for no form can by amendment be
changed to another. When you have chosen you must strictly
follow the technique which for some reason, probably historical,
belongs to that foim of revieN , whether there is any present advantage in it or not.
The choice bristles with perplexing dilemmas. The writ of
error should be used to review proceedings following the course
of the common law, but there is no authoritative test to determine what is the course of the common law. It lies only to
courts of record and only errors apparent upon the record, but
until the practice has become established it is not always clear
whether or to what extent a newly created court is of record and
what the record consists of. A proceeding may be started in a
court not of record and not proceeding according to the course
of the common law and after removal into a different court for
trial de novo may or may not become sufficiently a common "law
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proceeding to justify the use of a writ of error. And finally, if
.the appellant wishes to review the facts he can not use a writ of
error, because it is limited to a review of the law.
The writ of certiorariis available only if a writ of error or an
appeal, or some other remedy, is not available, or, if available, is
not adequate, and it is employed to review the acts of inferior
courts and of tribunals, commissions, magistrates, boards or
officers acting in a judicial capacity not according to the course
of the common law, but there is no authentic test as to what public bodies or proceedings the writ is applicable and no safe rule
as to when the other methods of review are sufficiently inadequate to justify resort to this one. It is commonly said that
certiorariwill lie only to review acts in excess of jurisdiction, and
not mere errors committed on the trial; but when is an error
jurisdictional in character? Furthermore, the remedy is discretionary, -and there is always uncertainty as to whether it will
be allowed.
The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is
granted only when no other adequate relief can be granted. This
refers us back to all the other remedies. Ex parte Harding, 219
U. S. 363, is an amazing discussion by the Supreme Court of the
United States of two inconsistent lines of cases in which the writ
was granted or refused, showing the extreme difficulty in drawing the line between its proper and improper use.
Prohibition is said to be means of keeping inferior courts of
every description within theiv proper jurisdictional limits, but
not to prevent an erroneous exercise of their jurisdictional power.
(High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies (3rd Ed.) Sec. 772.)
But where is the line between these shadowy concepts?
As for appeals, they are statutory proceedings adopted from
equity, and are subject to a multitude of statutory limitations,
express and implied. When authorized, are they additional
remedies, or are they deemed to be exclusive of all others? If
employed in legal actions do they operate only as writs of error
under another name, or do they convert proceedings in error
into rehearings on the facts as well as the law?
The volume of litigation which has involved the scope, purpose and proper limitations of these various appellate remedies
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has been appalling. I venture to say that the forms of action at
common law never approached these forms of appeal in their
burdensome consequences. Our appellate practice has become
such a perpetual source of litigation in practically all our States
that Corpus Juris devotes more space to Appeal and Error than
to any other subject in the law. The hopeless confusion which
baffles the ingenuity of counsel could not be better demonstrated
than by the admission of the appellate courts themselves that in
case of doubt between two methods of appeal it would be prudent
to use both. "The practice," says the United States Circuit
Court of Apipeals, by Sanborn, J., "of taking an appeal and a writ
of error to review the same adjudications is not only permissible,
but commendable, in cases in which counsel have just reason to
doubt which is the proper proceeding to give jurisdiction to the
appellate court. In such cases the reviewing court will consider
both proceedings, will dismiss the one which is ineffective, and
will review the ruling of the court below in accordance with the
rules of the method applicable to the nature of the case before
it." (Lockman '. Lang, 132 Fed. 1, 65 C. C. A. 621.)"
The first step toward a rational appellate procedure should
be the total abolition of all these forms, and the substitution of
a single form for appeal, consisting of a. siinple notice. The
problem of obtaining the various kinds .of appellate relief on a
single form of notice would be the same sort- of problem as obtaining various kinds of trial court relief"on a single form of complaint. -In the. ordinary jury case the appellant would give
notice of a demand for a reversal, or a new trial, in whole or in
part, and the form should be identically the same whether it is
an appeal from an inferior court or from a superior court of record. -In a law case without a jury, or an equity case, or any
other proceeding where the judge or other tribunal tries the
facts, notice of request for a rehearing on the law, or the facts,
or both, would be given. Where an order to the lower court
or tribunal directing it to act or desist from acting is desired,
corresponding to the command of the writ of mandamus or prohibition, the notice would specify it. As in the case of a pleading such relief ought to be given by the appellate court as the
case presented calls for, whether asked for or not, and no appeal
should ever fail because of any mistake or error on the part of
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the appellant as to what relief he is entitled to, if he is entitled to
any relief. The analogy between a case of review and a case of
first instance is complete, and both are capable of reduction to
the same degree of simplicity according to identical principles.
III. REVIEWING TRIBUNALS
Analgous to the mechanical problem of method is the administrative problem of appellate court organization. The great
number of appeals makes it necessary to provide a large number
of appellate judges. How should they be organized for maximum efficiency?
Inferior court appeals have usually been carried to the superior courts of general jurisdiction, which have taken care of
such appellate business in addition to their work as courts of
first instance. Such appeals involve small values, require prompt
decision, and can not carry a heavy expense to the parties, and
the commonly employed system of a local rehearing before a
judge of higher grade seems to meet the situation well enough.
The chief difficulty arises in appeals from superior courts.
Should appellate jurisdiction be divided, some cases going to one
court and some to another, with a possible second appeal? The
federal judiciary is so organized, and many States have adopted
the same plan. It is a logically attractive theory, but American
experience has uncovered many serious defects.
In the first place there is a complete lack of any sound basis
upon which the jurisdiction can be diviaed. This is evident from
the diversity and confusion in the distribution of appeals between intermediate and highest courts. It can be fairly said
that there is not a single question or field of the law, and not a
single case, which would not fall within the jurisdiction of an
inferior appellate court in some States and of the highest court
inothers.
And not only is there no principle upon which a workable
division of appellate business can be made, but the very lack of
such a principle fosters perpetual amendments of the provisions
regulating appeals. In 1906 Georgia, by a constitutional amendment, provided for a distribution of appeals between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and in 1916 it again
amended the constitution, completely changing the basis for the
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distribution. Illinois has never had any rest on this subject, and
after establishing a system in 1877 (L., p. 75), remodeled it in'
1879 (L., p. 169), again in 1887 (L., p. 136), again in 1907 (L., p.
467), and again in 1909 (L., p. 304). Indiana has enacted no less
than six complete and different schedules for appeals to the two
courts, in 1891 (Acts, Ch. 37), 1893 (Acts, p. 29), 1901 (Acts, Ch.
247), 1907 (Acts, Ch. 148), 1911 (Acts, Ch. 117), and 1914 (Acts,
Ch. 76), besides minor changes. No State has jsucceeded in
finding a plan for distributing appeals which seems to remain in
operation very long. And this will doubtless continue to be so,
because every system of apportionment is only an arbitrary and
capricious arrangement, without any principle of logic or convenience to support and sustain it.
Furthermore, litigation constantly goes on over the interpretation of statutes which apportion the appeals, so that the
same problem of jurisdiction emerges in the appellate procedure
which we meet in connection with the existence of more than one
trial court.
A no less serious difficulty growing out of the use of more
than one appellate court is the question of finality of decision in
the lower court, so as to allow or prevent successive appeals.
There is every conceivable degree of finality or lack of finality, in
tlese intermediate appeals, found among the American states
which employ such courts.
Double appeals are an economic waste and a menace to
public confidence in the courts. Reversals of one appellate court
by another appellate court tend to discredit the whole judicial
establishment in popular esteem. This is a serious thing under
present conditions. The cost and uncertainty of litigation have
always been two chief complaints against the administration of
justice, and double appeals certainly increase the first and emphasize the second. They often result in a final decision by a
minority of all the judges who have passed upon the case. In
the famous case of Allen v. Flood (1898), A. C. L., which involved a
double appeal, out of 21 judges of substantially equal ability,
who participated in the decisions, 13 were for the plaintiff, but
the defendant won. A close majority decision for reversal on a
second appeal will usually mean a decision by a minority of the
judges involved. This constantly occurs in all states which
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have intermediate courts.
The recognized evil of double appeals has undoubtedly had
a great influence in shaping the jurisdictional provisions of appellate court statutes, but the varying degrees of success with
which they have met the problem are very striking, Many devices have been employed. Some are relatively efficient, others
are not.. There is probably no state where any civil action may
not, under some circumstances, be carried through the intermediate court for a second appeal, so that no litigant can be sure
in advance that he may not have to fight his case through two
appellate courts.
Very few states have attempted to make the decisions of
the lower appellate court absolutely final, for the reason, no
doubt, that the highest court would thereby lose the supervisory
power over the decisions of inferior courts which the constitution
gives it or which it seems desirable that it shotld have.
To fully retain such supervisory power the Supreme Court
should have authority to bring up any case Srom the inferior appellate court which it believes merits its attention, and most
States recognize this practice either through express constitutional or statutory provisions or by implication from the constitutional nature of the court of last resort.
Another method of maintaining the final authority of the
Supreme Court, which is less direct and obviously less effective,
is by authorizing the inferior appellate court to certify cases or
questions to the Supreme Court for decision. This method is
frequently used in connection with the proceedings by certiorari,so
that a case may be sent up by the inferior court or called up by
the higher court, as either court may be induced or required.
Now it is obvious that if the final authority of the Supreme
Court is to be fully protected, an intermediate appellate court necessarily, iniplies either a second appeal, or an application for a
second appeal, as a possible incident in every case. This is
burdensome alike to the parties and to the courts, and the mere
right to apply for a seGond appeal produces substantially the same
burden upon both court and parties as the unrestricted right to
appeal.
The weight of this burden was'strikingly brought out by'
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Chief Justice Hiscock, of the New York Court of Appeals, in
discussing means for relieving that Court, at the meeting of the
New York State Bar Association in 1919. He said:
"During the last year, out of practically 400 contested
motions submitted to the Court, 215 or 216 were applications for
leave to appeal. Of those applications, 40, or about 20 per cent,
were granted. I think very likely that some members of the
Bar feel that they are being denied their proper and just rights
by this limitation upon the right to appeal. My judgment is
that between 90 and 99 per cent-I won't try to specify the exact
percentum-are getting, through the application to the Court
for leave to appeal, precisely the same consideration and the same
result that they would get if at the end of two years their appeal was
regularly considered on the calendar. Every applicationfor leave to
appeal takes precisely the same course as a regular appeal. It is assigned'in regular order to a member of the Court; it is considered
by all the members of the Court, and it is brought up in consultation and is there disposed of." (Report of the New York
State Bar Association, 1919, pp. 408-9.)
Denials of applications for certiorarior orders allowing an appeal are usually not published, but there is some data available.
Thus, inf Illinois, where double appeals had become such an intolerable burden that an act was passed in 1909, commonly called
the Certiorari Act, absolutely prohibiting appeals from the appellate court to the Supreme Court unless the lower court certified the case up or the Supreme Court itself brought up the
case for further review, but the persistence of counsel in seeking
leave to appeal has gone far to nullify the act. In Volume 216
of the Reports of the Illinois Appellate Courts, pp. xii-li, there
is a list of all the cases from the Appellate Courts reviewed by
the Supreme Court during a period of a little less than three
years, from 1917 to 1920, together with applications for certiorari
which were denied by the Supreme Court. There are about 329
cases in this list, and just one half of them were denials of petitions
for certiorari. In 1923 the situation had become even worse, and
out of 578 appeals from the Appellate Court, 309, or nearly 54 per
cent, were denials of petitions for certiorari. (See 231 Ill. App., pp.
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xiii-xlii.) The list of cases from the Court of Civil Appeals reviewed by the Supreme Court of Texas in 1923 shows 113 applications for writ of error refused as against 132 cases retained
for decisions on the merits of the appeal (114 Tex., pp. 585-605).
It is plain that the use of intermediate appellate courts has
been attended with many drawbacks. Two states, Colorado and
Kansas, totally abandoned their use after trying them. Such a
court was established in Colorado in 1891, and was abolished in
1905. Then in 1911 a new Court of- Appeals was created for a
period of four years, for the sole'purpose of clearing up the
Supreme Court docket, thereby making it practically a temporary
division of the Supreme Court, and in 1915 it finished its work
and ceased to exist. The Kansas Courts of'Appeals were established in 1895, to continue four years. Their jurisdiction was
similar to that of other such courts. At the end of the four-year
period there was not enough interest in them to continue their
life and they expired by limitation, after publishing ten volumes
of reports.
The two chief defects in the intermediate appellate court
system are uncertainty of jurisdiction and double appeals. They
can be removed only by removing the cause and establishing a
single appellate court to which all appeals go for final disposition. Such a court could sit in as many divisions as Were necessary, and the divisions could be located wherever convenience
directed. Three judges are enough to pass on any appeal if they
agree. A disagreement might be sufficient to authorize a rehearing before the division with one or two judges added, or before the full court. A considerable number of States have authorized the divisional organization of their courts of last report.
California, 1879 (Const., Art. 6, Sec. 2), Missouri, 1890
(Constl, Art. 6, Amend. of 1890), Georgia, 1896 (Const., Art. 6,
Sec. 2; L. 1896, No. 51), Kansas, 1900 (Const., Art. 3, Sec. 2),
Florida, 1902 (Const., Art. 5, Sec. 2), Alabama, 1903 (Code of
1907, Sec. 5949), Colorado, 1904 (Const., Art. 6, Sec. 5), Washington, 1909 (Const., Art. 4, Sec. 2; L. 1909, Ch. 24), Oregon,
1913 (Gen. L. of 1920, Sec. 3045), Iowa, 1913 (35 Gen. A., Ch.
22) Mississippi, 1914 (L. 1916, Ch. 152), Oklahoma, 1919 (L.
1919, Ch. 127).
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There is in every one of these constitutional or legislative
enactments suitable -provision for bringing such cases before a
larger number of judges, or before the entire court, as should receive such additional attention. Some provide that if there is a
dissent in any division the case shall go to the whole court;
others authorize the chief justice or a specified number of associate justices to -make such an order; some require all constitutional questions to go to the full court, and others prohibit any
former adjudication to be overruled or modified except by the
full court; some leave it to the court itself to decide how cases
shall be assigned or referred to the full court or to divisions.
The apparent objections which readily suggest themselves
do not seem to be meritorious. One is the possibility of inconsistencies between the different divisions. This cannot be
greater than the possibility of inconsistencies between an intermediate and a supreme court, or between different divisions of
an intermediate court, or between different cases decided, by the
same court at different times. But the danger of inconsistencies
is very small. In any event the judges can not personally remember prior decisions of the court and must rely upon their own
study of the reports and the diligence of counsel, and it will
make very little difference whether the prior decisions happen
to be madfe by an undivided or a divisional court.
IV.

SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF REVIEW

With a very few statutory exceptions, proceedings in the
United States, brought to review judgments at law, are proceedings in error. That is to say the appellate court does not
pass upon the merits of the decision, nor does it determine what
the true decision ought to be, but it is confined to an examination
of the alleged errors committed below. The question preented
is only whethererror of law was actually committed. If it was,
the judgment may be reversed, if not the judgment should be
affirmed. The essence of the proceeding on a writ of error is the
assignments of error, which specify the errors complairied of and
constitute what is in effect the pleading in the court of errors.
(Williston v. Fisher, 28 Ill. 43.) The same thing is accomplished in
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certiorariby specifying the alleged errors in the petition for the writ.
(4 Encyc. Pl. & Pr. 145.) But the appellate -court does no more
than determine the existence of error, and whether such error, if
it exists, is prejudicial or harmless; and if there is reversible error
the case is sent back to the lower court to be proceeded with according to law or as the appellate court shall direct.
It follows from these principles that no matter can be passed
upon in review that was not previously passed upon below, for
there can be no error without an adjudication. New questions
can never be raised. Thus Chancellor Kent observed in Gelston v.
Hoyt, 13 Johns. 561, that "Lord Eldon said it was well known as
an established rule, that no point not made in the court below, could
be made on appeal to the house of lords. This is a just and wise
rule; for the very theory and constitution of a court of appellate
jurisdiction only, is the correction of errors which a court below
may have committed; and a court below can not be said to have
committed an error when its judgment was never called into
exercise, and the point of law was never taken into consideration
......
To assume the discussion and consideration of a matter of law, which the party would not discuss in the Supreme
C6urt, and which that court, therefore, did not consider, is to
assume in effect original jurisdiction." And with true judicial
loyalty to established practice, the learned chancellor exclaims:
"It is impossible to calculate all the mischief to which such a
course of proceeding would lead."
But the mischiefs caused by the traditional practice may also
be extremely serious. In State v. Garcia, 19 N. Mex. 414, Francisco
Garcia and another were indicted for murder, and both were
found guilty of manslaughter. In its opinion on review the Supreme Court says: "A curious fact appears in the case. Francisco Garcia, one of the defendants, became engaged in an altercation with the deceased, whereupon deceased shot Garcia and
he fell to the floor, and remained there, unconscious, during the
whole of the remainder of the difficulty. Cipriano Garcia, his
brother, was at the time at the back of the saloon where the
difficulty occurred, and took no part in the same up to that time.
Upon hearing the shot and seeing his "brother fall to the floor, he
rushed to his rescue, encountered the deceased, and killed him.
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No proof of concerted action on the part of the brother is shown.
It thus appears that it was physically impossible for Francisco
Garcia to be guilty of any crime in this connection, and he was
entitled to an instruction to the jury to acquit him. Had the
matter been called to the attention of the court before instructing
the jury, no doubt he would have so directed them. But counsel
sat quiet. Nor did counsel call the attention of the court to this
proposition in the motion for a new trial. Under such circumstances, no relief can be granted here. No question is here for
decision; the court below never having decided the point .....
The remedy of the defendant, Francisco, is an application to the
Governor for pardon ..... The judgment of the lower court will
be affirmed, and it is so ordered."
This monstrous sacrifice of justice on the altar of a common
law procedural tradition was too much for the court, however,
,and on a rehearing which the court subsequently granted it held
that there was inherent power in every court to see that a man's
fuhdamental rights are protected in every case, and that the necessity of an assignment of error upon a ruling of the trial court
was a restriction upon the parties, not upon' the court. But
the court still was unable to see its way to order a judgment for
this innocent defendant, and only ordered a new trial. The case
is a reductio ad absurdunm of the common law proceeding in error.
As distinguished from the proceedings in error employed
by the common law courts, equity used an appeal, which was a
complete rehearing of the case, or so much of it as was questioned, as to both the law and the facts. On this rehearing the
appellate court had power to consider the entire merits of the case
in the light of the decision below, but it was not bound by the
decision below even upon matters of fact. The appellate court
was supplied with a full transcript of all the proceedings, so far
as they were relevant to the questions raised on review, so that
it was as well qualified to make a final disposition of the case as
the trial court would be, in consequence of which cases were not
usually sent back, as at law, but were finally disposed of by this
reviewing court.
It is to be noted that equity never adopted from the law
courts the idea that part of the proceedings should be recorded
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and part should not. It never gave a higher value, for example,
to the pleadings than to the proof, nor developed afiappellate
system which was founded on anything less than the entire case
as tried below. On a review in equity the question was not as
to the commission or non-commission of error, but whether-the
case had been rightly or wrongly decided on the merits. (Flahrtyv.
McCormick, 123 Ill. 525.) But the case was not tried de novo upon
appeal. The appeal rather "involved the idea of a review of the
proceedings in a trial which has already been had, and not a new
trial of the case." (State v. Williams, 40 S. C. 373.)
In review both at law and in equity, the secondary character
of the proceeding was strictly observed. No new questions could
be considered. New evidence was never admitted in the House
of Lords in a chancery appeal, and if evidence offered below was
rejected and therefore not passed upon by the trial court, the
House would not receive it, but.would remit the case to be reheard below. (2 Daniel Chan. Prac. *1504.) In cases at law new
evidence could not ordinarily be received and passed upon without interfering with the jurisdiction of the jury over questions
of fact, and this was the ground upon which it was often rejected.
But the real basis for rejecting all evidence was that it was inconsistent with the position of the reviewing court.
But there is nothing legally impossible or inherently difficult
in enlarging the scope of appellate action in law cases beyond
the exceptions taken and the errors assigned, and in making the
review"a re-examination of the entire case upon the merits, as in
equity, except in so far as it would interfere with findings properly
made by a jury. If this were to be done, the importance of the
technical record, as distinguished from the proceedings had
upon the trial, would lose even its theoretical foundation, and
appellate records at law might be made up exactly like those
in equity. Actions at law tried by the court without a jury could
be treated on appeal exactly like actions in equity, and where
issues were left to a jury, which should not have been so left, such
issues could be dealt with by the appellate court exactly as
though the matter had been decided by the trial court. - And we can
go a step ft.ther.. There is nothing about an appellate tribunal
which should render it incapable of exercising such powers of
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a trial court as are convenient in conrection with the review and
final disposition of cases, such as passing on the features of the
case omitted by the trial court, or considering new matters not
involved in the case as tried. Such changes would place the appellate court in a position to render the maximum service in the
administration of justice.
Some of these features have been adopted in whole or in
part in some of the American States. All of them were adopted
in England under the Judicature Acts. A single method of review wag devised for all cases, and the archaic nomenclature
which carried with it .so much of formality and tradition, was
completely discarded. Every case was to be entirely re-examined, so far as the parties found any fault with it, both on the
law and on the facts, subject only to issues properly found by the
jury; and it was to be finally disposed of in such a way as justice
and convenience required.
In order to make it certain that the ancient limitations upon
appellate power should not hamper the courts in disposing of
any appeal, it was provided that "all'-appeais to the Court of
Appeal shall be by way of rehearing," (Order 58, rule 1), and
that "the Court of Appeal shall have all the powers and duties
as to amendment and otherwise of the High Court, together
with full discretionary power to receive further evidence upon
questions of fact, such evidence to be either by oral examination
in court, by affidavit, or by disposition taken before an examiner
or commissioner. Such further evidence may be given with
special leave upon interlocutory application, or in any case as to
matters which have occurred after the date of the decision from
which the appeal is brouglt .... The Court of Appeal shall have
power to draw inferences of fact and to give any judgment and
make any order which ought to have been made, and to make
Such
such further or other order as the case may require ......
powers may also be exercised in favor of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may
not have appealed or complained of the decision." (Order 58,
rule 4). And ini further pursuance of the same principle, order
40, rule 10, authorizes the Court of Appeal on a motion for a
new trial to give final judgment if it believes all the necessary
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information is before it, or to order the motion to stand over
until such further issues or questions shall be tried or determined, and such accounts and inquiries taken, as it may deem
necessary.
These provisions effectually destroy the doctrine that assignments of error, or their equivalents in equity, are necessary
for the exercise of appellate power, for a rehearing has been defined to mean an appeal which is not confined to the points mentioned in the notice of appeal. (Purnell v. Great Western Ry., I. Q.
B. D. 636, 640.)
V.

THE APPELLATE RECORD

Since an appeal or proceeding in error is primarily a review
of a case which has already been tried, the appellate record should
consist primarily of a copy of what has already been submitted
in the trial court. No alterations are necessary, and if required
their preparation becomes a burdensome load on the profession.
This was the trouble with the common law bills of exceptions.
Equity, less ham ?edby tradition, substituted for them a simple transcript of the entire proceedings below.
When a case is to be reviewed upon any matter involving
the testimony, a stenographer's transcript is almost always
needed, and it is ordered almost as a matter of course. This
primary record of the trial or hearing, having once been prepared, ought to pass directly into the record on appeal, without
any attempt to reduce its scope or change its form, for the labor
involved in eliminating irrelevant portions and in substituting a
narrative form for questions and answers, is out of all proportion
to the advantages sought. Briefs or abstracts of counsel can
properly be employed to summarize the facts and point out the
material portions of the testimony, with such references to the
pages of the transcript as may be necessary, for the convenience
of the court, but the copy as originally obtained from the stenographer is the simplest, cheapest and most authentic record that
can be prepared for review.
Bills of exception came to us from England, as a part of
our common law, but they have become as extinct as the Dodo
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in the land of their origin. The theory of an English appeal
involves no technical difficulties whatever. The appellati record
is merely a copy of existing documents, and can be prepared
mechanically by any competent -clerk. To perfect the appeal
the appellant serves a notice upon the respondents that he will
move the Court of Appeal in fourteen days to reverse the judgment, and files with the clerk of that court three typewritten
copies of the notice of appeal and of the pleadings, evidence and
opinion below. That is absolutely all. No exceptions are noted
and no errors are assigned.
There is no reason why the court stenographer could not
make as many carbon copies of his transcript as will be needed
by a small appellate court, so that the expense of any further
copying will be entirely avoided. If the court is too large or
the parties are too numerous, the stenographer could make his
original transcription upon a mimeograph stencil and then, at a
merely nominal cost, run off as many copies as might be wanted.
The cost of recopying and of printing records is largely a pure
waste, and adds enormously to the expense of litigation. A system which would bring to the appellate court the materials necessary for its review and at the same time eliminate every useless expenditure, would be an unmixed economic blessing. People are not obliged to litigate their differences, and not many of
them will do so unless they believe that the benfits are worth the
cost. The constant effort of modern business is to eliminate
waste and thereby reduce costs, and the legal profession may
well take to heart the example of its business clients.
The simplification of the mechanism of review has reached
its climax in the English Court of Criminal Appeal. The whole
process there becomes an administrative official function, with
which counsel are not required to concern themselves at all.
Blank forms of application for leave to appeal are placed in all
the prisons and it is the duty of the governor of every prison
to furnish prisoners with the blanks and instructions for filling
them out. They are short, simple, and non-technical, and are
easily understood. When completed, the forms are sent to the
clerk of the court where the conviction took place, and it is his
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official duty to perfect the appeal, prepare the entire record, and
take the proper .teps to bring it on for hearing. No matter of
form and no mistake in any procedural step is permitted to have
any effect upon the prisoner's right to a hearing on the merits,
and the worst that can happen is that correction may be called
for.
Appellate procedure in the United States is more desperately
in need of reform than any other branch of procedural law. It
is full of useless forms, unnecessary distinction and outgrown
traditions. It is largely mechanical in its aim and purpose, and
yet in an industrial age, among a people which leads the world
in labor saving devices, we are still fumbling with the crude
machinery which England discarded more than half a century
ago. We should follow the lead of modern American business
and have the whole system reorganized under the advice of capable efficiency experts.

